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Abstract: The risk analysis of a system is a multidisciplinary process in constant 
evolution. Indeed, if a few years ago, analyses were limited at the technical level, it 
is today necessary to consider the system in a global way, by including Human 
beings and Organisations. But this involves an increasing complexity of the studied 
system, because of the widening of its limits and the diversity of considered 
disciplines. This article proposes a method to structure the knowledge in a decision-
making model. 
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In classified installations1 (nuclear power plants, 
chemical plants …), the occurrence of a critical event 
(major accident) cannot be accepted. In May 1998, 
the database MARS2, listing major accidents which 
have occurred in European Union, indicated that 
human failures represent 64% of deep causes of 
declared accidents (11% due to an operator failure, 
and 53% to a dysfunction of the organisation).  
Thus, the risk analysis of these installations has to 
consider not only the technical dimension, but also 
human beings who influence it and organisations in 
which they evolve. By making this analysis, the risk 
of critical scenarios omission can be reduced and the 
real evolving of the system can be more easily 
understood. 
It is also necessary to have a quantitative model 
allowing the simulation of the system evolving in 
order to help the decision-making (to compare 
several safety barriers impacts on system 
components …). 
In these objectives, this article presents principles of 
a risk analysis at a technical level, specificities of the 
risk analysis of a socio-technical system, a method 
allowing to structure the knowledge and a method for 
the integration of safety barriers. 
 
2. TECHNICAL RISK ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, some characteristics of standard risk 
analysis are underlined in order to present the context 
of the problematic. 
 
What is the risk and how can it be assessed? 
 
Risk is a largely studied concept. Many authors have 
developed their own definition. For the standard ISO 
14121 (1999) it is the combination of the occurrence 
                                                 
1
 It is a permanent installation of which the operating 
presents risks for the environment. 
2
 Major Accident Reporting System. 
probability of damage and its gravity. It can also be 
defined as an event or a sequence of events that can 
prevent achievements of entity (or group) objectives, 
or can reduce the organisation capacity to carry out 
its objectives (Deleuze, 2005).  
In this problematic, the risk is defined as the 
association of cause and consequence events 
characteristics of a given situation (Gouriveau, 
2003). 
 
Risk assessment. This process is defined in the 
standard ISO 14121 (1999) as a series of logical 
steps that allow the expert to examine, in a 
systematic way, dangerous events associated to a 
















Fig.1. Risk assessment and risk reduction processes 
 
The ‘Bow-tie’ risk analysis 
 
In this problematic, the objective is the study of 
critical events (ERC in the technical level of the 
fig.2) which are characterised by a loss of 
containment (LOC, for fluids) or a loss of physical 
integrity (LPI, for solids) for a classified installation3. 
                                                 
3
 The risk of core fusion in a nuclear power plant for 
instance. 
 Start 
Determination of the machine limits 
Identification of dangerous 
phenomena 






























Fig.2. Conceptual diagram for a global risk analysis  
 
The ‘bow-tie’ method (in the technical level of the 
fig.2) is a suitable one to compute a technical 
analysis. This is a method developed in the European 
project ARAMIS4 (Andersen, et al., 2001). It is 
composed of a fault tree (left part of the scheme) and 
an event tree (right part of the scheme). 
In this method each path defines an accident scenario. 
Thus it allows the description of an accident scenario 
occurrence from initiators to final consequences by 
taking into account barriers operation. 
 
Limitations and new needs 
 
Unfortunately the method described above is only 
usable at a technical level, and recent studies have 
shown the implication of Humans beings and 
Organisations in the occurrence of major accidents: 
Tchernobyl explosion in 1986, Ladbroke Grove 
collision train in 1999 (Cullen, 2001a; Cullen, 
2001b), Columbia crash in 2003 (Caib, 2003)… 
Consequently this method has to be modified in order 
to integrate these dimensions in the analysis. 
Moreover, current methods are not adapted because 
they are limited to Boolean variables and uncorrelated 
relations and they do not include repairing notions 
and temporal dependencies. 
And then, since 2003, it is necessary to take into 
account the law 2003-699 (JO 175, 2003). This law 
requests the introduction of the probability concept in 
any risk analysis. 
 
3. GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS 
 
In this section the risk analysis principles of a 
complex socio-technical system taken in its 
environment are described. 
 
Characteristics of the system 
 
As presented in the first part, the starting point of the 
analysis is the technical system, which is constrained 
by external processes.  
                                                 
4
 Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS 
in the context of the Seveso II directive. 
These processes are divided into four distinct 
categories (fig.2) inspired by the SAM5 approach 
(Paté-Cornell and Murphy, 1996): 
- The Decisions and actions level which represents 
processes linked with the decision-making at the 
individual level, 
- The Internal organisational level which represents 
processes linked with the management of the 
enterprise (in which the individual evolves), 
- The External organisational level which represents 
processes linked with the social climate (in which 
the enterprise evolves), 
- The Natural environment level which represents 
processes linked with the evolution of the physical 
and natural climate. 
 
This system can be qualified as complex because of 
its nature. This involves several abstraction levels, 
multiple elements by levels, a large number of 
relations between elements, a complexity of relations 
between elements (horizontal exchanges) and 
between levels (vertical exchanges and transactional 
exchanges, fig.2).  
 
This architecture shows the need to establish relations 
between different kinds of levels in the model: 
- The technical level, often qualified as a closed 
system (identified limits, causality relations and 
interactions relatively identifiable), 
- The Human/Organisational level, often qualified as 
an open system (difficulties to determine limits, in 
permanent change, being adaptive and iterative). 
 
Thus, this kind of system can be qualified as being 
quasi-isolated (it is influenced by its environment on 
its inputs and it influences this environment through 
its outputs) and partially broken down (it can be 
broken down into subsystems, linked together and 
with the environment, which are quasi-isolated) (Le 
Moigne, 1990). As a result, a modelling process is 
required to standardize the model building. 
 
 












































































































































































































































     
Specificities of the global risk analysis 
 
In a general way, an expert (or a working group) has 
to meet various needs to fulfil a risk analysis (fig.3). 
Fig.3. Needs met by the risk analysis 
 
This scheme shows that the quantitative model is only 
needed in the predict step. This step is helpful for the 
decision-making because it allows, by studying the 
system evolving, the comparison of several strategies. 
But the prediction can be done only if the system 
operating has been previously described and 
understood (in order to represent influential factors). 
And finally the communication of results (or ideas) 
can be done after each step according to required 
objectives (Duval, et al., 2006). 
 
The main steps of a global risk analysis are described 
in fig.4. 
Fig.4. Steps of a global risk analysis in a perspective 
of decision-making support 
 
This kind of analysis is composed of the aggregation 
of the technical analysis in one hand and the 
organisational/human analysis in other hand. Some 
similarities between these analyses can also be 
underlined:  
- The expertise is considered as a source of data, 
often qualitative, and sometimes quantitative 
(Lannoy, Procaccia, 2001). In the organizational 
and human analysis, the general survey is a matter 
of listing human and organisational analyses of 
accidents, incidents, crises in any domains in order 
to build up a library of known cases. 
- The definition of the system consists of an 
identification of variables, a definition of the level 
of detail and a definition of system limits. 
- The experience feedback (EF) is a process including 
methods and procedures to draw lessons from 
known accidents and incidents so that they do not 
reappear. The specific survey is a matter of selecting 
among cases identified in the generic survey those 
which are most similar with the analysed situation. 
- The identification of risks consists of determining 
influence links between significant variables of the 
technical system. The current situation analysis 
allows to determine influence links between 
significant variables of the human and 
organisational system. 
- The representation of the situation is the step in 
which the qualitative model is built. 
- The quantified treatment is the step of risk 
estimation. Two kinds of data are used: probabilities 
(for data with EF) and experts’ judgments (for the 
others). 
- The decision-making is the step in which risks are 
classified and different measures are proposed, and 
this information is presented to decision makers.  
 
4. MODEL STRUCTURE  
 
In this section the content of each abstraction level 
defined in the model is depicted (fig.2) and a 




The conceptual diagram proposed in fig.2 shows that 
the organisational level (internal and external) does 
not have a direct influence on the technical level 
because this level needs the intervention of the human 
resource to apply organisational changes. 
 
The technical level. In this level, the approach to built 
a ‘bow-tie’ is composed of three steps: (1) a 
functional analysis is done to gather equipments by 
function, then (2) a dysfunctional analysis is carried 
out (an FMEA6 is done to identify relevant failure 
modes of each material in order to determine their 
causes and effects on global performances) and (3) a 
list of sensitive components is established (from the 
previous FMEA, experts’ judgments and experience 
feedback). 
 
The decisions and actions level. This level 
characterise a confidence degree of specific human 
actions. Thus, a human action may be considered as a 
safety barrier, or an actor of this barrier (i.e. having a 
direct influence), or an initiator of this barrier (i.e. 
having an indirect influence). The objective is not to 
describe human behaviours in all situations implied 
by the system operating (ergonomics), nor to 
characterise all situations in which the human action 
is faulty (human reliability).  
 
The organisational level (internal and external). The 
modelling approach of this level is dysfunctional 
because considering the good operating of this 
dimension needs to define a lot of variables which 
may limit data aggregation. It is based on Dien, et al. 
(2004) which depict the organisation in a global way 
and represent it by organisational factors7 and 
associated indicators8.  
                                                 
6
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. 
7
 An organisational factor appearing in the occurrence of an 
accident will be described as ‘pathogenic’. It results of the 
aggregation of convergent signs which allow the 
characterisation of an unfavourable influence in the 
occurrence of an accident. 
8
 They are signs and elements characterising the situation 
(symptomatic of the presence of such a factor). 
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Definition of the system, 
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D.  Representation of the situation 
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Organizational and Human analysis 
  
     
The natural environment level. It is composed of 
physical phenomena which affect the technical 
system (weather data, geographical implantation …). 
  
The barriers integration 
 
The conceptual diagram, depicted in fig.2, does not 
allow a clear representation of possible impacts of a 
barrier on system elements (specifically for human 
and organisational ones). In this objective, the study 
is focused on the integration of these safety barriers in 
the model.  
 
Definitions. A safety barrier can be defined as an 
entity installed in the system to prevent the 
occurrence of a risky scenario. This barrier could be, 
according to its position in the scenario, a preventive 
or a protective one: 
- A preventive barrier is located upstream of the 
critical event (it prevents or limits the critical event 
occurrence), 
- A protective barrier is located downstream of the 
critical event (it reduces consequences of this 
event).  
 
But according to resources it involves, a safety barrier 
can also be classified into one of the three following 
categories: 
- The organisational barrier, composed of a 
management activity (regular follow-up of operator 
trainings according to activities fulfilled), 
- The human barrier, composed of a human activity 
(visual monitoring of a technical process), 
- The technical barrier, composed of a safety device 
or an instrumented system of safety (safety valve, 
sensor …). 
 
A fourth category can also be defined: combined 
barriers. This type of barriers involves different sort 
of resources. Three kinds of combined barriers can be 
distinguished: 
- the T-H barrier, with T for technical resources 
involved and H for human one (alarm in control 
room and associated actions done by operators in 
the workshop). 
- the H-O barrier, with O for organisational resources 
involved (the realisation of a procedure with a 
regular control of the management: statement of 
temperatures in a warehouse and reports given to 
the HSE9 director). 
- the T-H-O barrier: the realisation of a procedure 
combining technical and human intervention with a 
regular control of the management (maintenance 
actions of technical equipments with control of 
directors in case of sensitive equipment 
replacements). 
In this configuration, we cannot have a T-O barrier, 
indeed the human resource is necessary to achieve 
decisions taken by the management. 
 
The formalisation of the barriers integration is then 
composed of four steps: 
- Step 1: The modelling of the system (fig.2), 
                                                 
9
 Hygiene, Safety, Environment. 
- Step 2: The identification of operating barriers and 
the new ones that could be established, 
- Step 3: The classification of these barriers according 
to resources they involve, 
- Step 4:  The integration of their influences on the 
system (fig. 5). 
Fig.5. The integration of barriers in the model 
 
The selection of one barrier defined in the list 
activates, at least, one of the three following variables 
(fig. 5): 
- Ro, representing the realisation of an organisational 
safety barrier, 
- Rh, representing the realisation of a human one, 
- Rt, representing the realisation of a technical one, 
- Rc, representing a combination of the three previous 
variables (Ro+Rh or Rh+Rt or Ro+Rh+Rt). 
 
The definition of these variables allows an explicit 
representation of a barrier impact on the system. 
 
5. BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL 
 
In this section, the justification of the modelling tool 
is done and then a generic modelling structure 
allowing the barriers integration is proposed. 
 
Why Bayesian networks are used?  
 
Many tools can be used to build the risk analysis 
model and the choice of an adapted one depends of 
aims sought by users (Villemeur, 1992). 
 
A comparative study (relating to tree-based methods, 
network/graph-based methods, experts systems and 
fuzzy logic) was achieved to help the choice of an 
adapted tool.  
According to its generic specificities, which allow the 
use of qualitative and/or quantitative models, 
Bayesian networks seem to be an adapted tool for this 
modelling problematic.  
Concerning the technical level, Bayesian networks are 
a generalisation of trees formalism (thus, methods 
like fault trees, event trees … can be easily translated 
into Bayesian networks) (Bobbio, et al., 2001). This 
formalism allows, for this abstraction level, the 
representation of system reconfigurations (they are a 
way of specifying a Markov chain) (Weber and 
Jouffe, 2003), the treatment of partially correlated 
failures (in opposition with fault trees which consider 
common causes failures, thus completely correlated 
failures), and the modelling and propagation of 
uncertainties in the model from initiators to output 
indicators (Weber and Jouffe, 2006). 
Concerning organisational/human levels, they allow 
correlations between variables, the gathering and/or 
merging of various kinds of knowledge (experience 
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modelling of different abstraction levels (object 
oriented Bayesian networks) (Weber and Jouffe, 
2006), and the use of multi-modal variables. 
But two limitations can be underlined: 
- the limit of the graphical model compared to the 
reality, and more specifically for human and 
organisational levels (which are generally presented 
in a textual form), 
- the transposition of the qualitative model (the causal 
graph) to the quantitative model (the probabilistic 
representation). 
However, it is necessary to exceed these limits to 
carry out a quantitative analysis in a decision-making 
objective. 
 
Generic modelling structure 
 
As described in part 2.2, a barrier is directly 
integrated in the scenario. But when the modelling 
tool is used, the representation becomes somewhat 
different. Indeed, in the Bayesian network, the barrier 
is integrated as a parent of the event it 
protects/prevents. 
 
As defined in the Sam approach (Paté-Cornell and 
Murphy, 1996) and according to the part 3.1, the 
direction of influence goes from management to 
actors and then to the technical system (from the top 
to the down). 
Moreover, ARAMIS principles request the 
independence of barrier components and control 
systems (for instance: redundancy barriers) in one 
hand, and other safety functions in other hand. 
This implies that a safety barrier implementation (Ro, 
Rh, Rt) cannot impact directly another safety barrier 
implementation. 
But this implementation needs some resources, which 
can be unavailable for another barrier implementation 
(in the case of an indirect influence, and particularly 
at decisions and actions, and organisational levels).  
So, two kinds of generic configurations can be 
defined:  
- The direct impact (fig.6): the barrier impacts 
directly the system and only it (elements in the same 
abstraction level than the concerned barrier). 
- The indirect impact (fig.7a and fig.7b): the barrier 
impacts directly the system and indirectly other 
barriers implementation (elements in the same 
abstraction level or in an inferior one than the 
concerned barrier). 
In this formalisation, a combined barrier is a specific 
case of direct and indirect impacts (fig.7c). 
Fig.6. Direct impact 
Fig.7a. Indirect impact (in the same abstraction 
level, x and y belong to the same level) 
Fig.7b. Indirect impact (between different 
abstraction levels, x belongs to the level i and y 







Fig.7c. Direct and indirect impact (in the specific 










































































































































A1: manual actuator (opened) 
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The studied system (fig.8) consists of a transitional 
storage tank (the product, liquid pentane, is stored in 
the tank during a short period, from 30 minutes to 2 
hours). This product is extremely flammable in air (its 
boiling point is 36°C). Thus, the storage operation is 
made in presence of gaseous nitrogen which prevent 
any reaction with air (ignition for example). 
Different safety components are installed: a manual 
actuator (A1), a vent hole (for little pressure rises), a 
safety valve (for important pressure rises), a pressure 
sensor and a retention pool.  
Two components need a regular and specific control: 
the actuator 1 and the safety valve. 
These controls need human resources and specific 
formations (organised and implemented by the 
management): 
- The actuator 1 has to remain open (to insure an 
optimal pentane output). The proposed solution is a 
padlocking and a regular follow-up (actions 
schedule). 
- The safety valve has to be operational in case of 
important pressure rise. The proposed solution is a 
regular control of the good operating of this 
component. 
The studied scenario is the risk of pressure rise in the 
tank which can lead to the tank explosion (and this 
event can produce a fire in the workshop). The 
proposed context is: 
- a temperature upper than 30°C (in summer), 
- liquid pentane in the tank, 
- insufficient quantity of nitrogen in the tank.    
In this context, the liquid pentane changes into 
gaseous pentane. This leads to a pressure rise in the 
tank which is evacuated by the vent hole and the 
safety valve (in a good operating). 
 
The scenario modelling 
 
The global risk analysis of this scenario needs several 
steps to be achieved. The first one consists of the 
technical analysis (thus the ‘bow-tie’ building). The 
second one consists of the ‘decisions and actions’ and 
‘organisational’ variables identification (related to the 
barriers integration). And the last one consists of the 
Bayesian network building. 
 
The ‘bow-tie’ building step (fig.9) allowed: 
- The identification of the preventive barriers 
(actuator 1, pressure sensor, vent hole, safety valve) 
and the protective one (retention pool). 
- The identification of two secondary dreaded events 
(a liquid pentane emission and/or a gaseous one). 
Thus, it implies different local impacts on output 
indicators (safety: human and environment, 
availability: productivity and durability: production 
material). 
 
But this analysis does not allow the comprehension of 
staff and management influences on the barrier 
operating and on the scenario occurrence.  
For this, it is necessary to define influential actions 
(which can be effective only if they have been 
accepted by the management and the staff): 
- Concerning the organisational level, the 
management has to implement staff trainings to 
manual actuators padlocking and to safety valve 
monitoring procedures. 
- Concerning the decisions and actions level, the staff 
has to achieve specific actions (actuator padlocking 
and valve monitoring) and these actions require 
availability.  
  
Thus, in the Bayesian network (fig.10), barriers 
effectiveness is, at least, related to the physical state 
of the component (itself depending on the component 
implementation in the system, Rt). If the considered 
barrier is a combined one, it is also related to the 
operation fulfilment by the staff (itself depending on 
the staff decision acceptance, Rh) and indirectly to its 
training for the concerned procedure (itself depending 
on the management decision acceptance, Ro).  
Concerning the probabilities tables quantification, it is 
necessary to carry out a combinatory logic analysis in 
one hand and an experience feedback analysis in 
Organisational level




     
other hand (with the use of experts’ judgments and 




In the first case, there is no preventive barriers 
implemented in the system (at the technical level), the 
considered month is august (thus the critical 
temperature risk is increased) and the quantity of 
pentane in the tank is important. In this context, the 
tank explosion can occur with a probability of 72%. 
The technical implementation of all preventive 
barriers allows to reduce the probability occurrence of 
the critical event to 0.67%. 
 
If now, the tank explosion has occurred (all the 
preventive barriers were down), the protective barrier 
operating can be studied: 
 
Quantity of pentane Global 
impact 
Retention pool 
implementation Imp. Med. Lit. 
No 36.44 18.65 5.69 Safety (%) Yes 23.53 12.23 3.45 
No 36.71 15.20 3.20 Availability 
(%) Yes 20.44 7.61 0.90 
No 33.87 14.27 3.20 Durability 
(%) Yes 18.09 6.90 0.90 
  
In the second case, only the pressure valve is 
considered (all of other barriers are not implemented), 
the considered month is august and the quantity of 
pentane is important. Thus, this configuration allows 
the staff and management influences appraisal on the 
system and on the considered barrier efficiency: 
 










efficiency 87.88% 92.72% 96.64% 
Tank 













action (d) 43.85% 68.28% 88.06% 
(a) for ‘present and controlled’, (b) for ‘present but 




In this article an architecture allowing to structure the 
knowledge for a global risk analysis was defined and 
a method for the integration of safety barriers in an 
objective of decision-making was proposed.  
The first point allowed to justify the need of a global 
risk analysis for hazardous installations, to propose a 
method to carry out this analysis, to determine 
different levels (and their components) that have to be 
considered in such an analysis and to justify the use 
of Bayesian networks in this context. 
The second one allowed a generic modelling of the 
barrier integration (fitting a great number of 
applications) and a clear visualisation of safety 
barriers impacts.  
But some points need to be studied more precisely: 
- The modelling of decisions and actions and 
organisational levels (which degree of preciseness 
can we define? Is a probability quantification 
possible? …). 
- The propagation of uncertainties (any risk analysis 
is subjected to measures and models uncertainties). 
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